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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is an important mechanism for promoting cooperation among self-interested agents.
Simplified, it means you help me, therefore somebody else will help you (in contrast to direct reciprocity:
you help me, therefore I will help you). Indirect reciprocity can be achieved via reputation and norms.
Strategies, such as the so-called leading eight, relying on these principles can maintain high levels of coop-
eration and remain stable against invasion, even in the presence of errors. However, this is only the case
if the reputation of an agent is modeled as a shared public opinion. If agents have private opinions and
hence can disagree if somebody is good or bad, even rare errors can cause cooperation to break apart. We
show that most strategies can overcome the private assessment problem by applying pleasing. A pleasing
agent acts in accordance with others’ expectations of their behavior (i.e. pleasing them) instead of being
guided by their own, private assessment. As such, a pleasing agent can achieve better reputations than
previously considered strategies when there is disagreement in the population. Pleasing is effective even
if only the opinions of few other individuals are considered and when it bears additional costs. Finally,
through a more exhaustive analysis of the parameters’ space than previous studies, we show that some
of the leading eight still function under private assessment, i.e. that cooperation rates are well above
an objective baseline. Yet, pleasing strategies supersede formerly described ones and enhance cooperation.




Cooperation is already considered central to complex life (Nowak, 2006; Perc et al., 2017) and may prove2
central to artificial systems as well (Langton, 1997). But cooperation relies on a handful of mechanisms3
that can enable it (Perc et al., 2017; Nowak, 2006). These include kin (Hamilton, 1964) and group selection4
(Traulsen and Nowak, 2006), direct and indirect reciprocity (Nowak, 2006; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005),5
spatial networks (Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Perc et al., 2013), different forms of incentives (Fehr and6
Gachter, 2000; Sigmund et al., 2001), and pre-commitments (Nesse, 2001; Han et al., 2013). Among7
these, indirect reciprocity stands out because it does not require any relatedness or other structural8
order between individuals, nor does it require repeated interactions (Rand and Nowak, 2013; Nowak and9
Sigmund, 2005; Okada, 2020a). This makes it especially relevant for modern global economies, where10
human or artificial agents often engage in non-repeated interactions. Indeed, real-world applications of11
indirect reciprocity, particularly, reputation-based systems, are prevalent in e-commerce (Jiang and Li,12
2007; Standifird, 2001), socio-technical systems (Andras et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2013) and artificial13
societies (Conte and Paolucci, 2002; Smaldino and Lubell, 2014).14
Indirect reciprocity is usually modeled using self-interested agents playing the donation game (Sig-15
mund, 2016): a random agent (donor) is selected to pay a personal cost c to grant benefit b to another16
randomly selected agent (recipient). The benefit is assumed to be bigger than the cost, i.e. b > c. Hence,17
it is best for the population collectively if every agent decides to take the cost, so that the sum of all18
wealth would increase by b − c > 0 with each interaction. However, the individually preferred choice19
for each agent is to avoid the cost (i.e. defect), making the game a social dilemma. Thus, to maintain20
cooperation and prevent defection, agents may use strategies that are based on reputations and norms21
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006).22
The reputation of the recipient determines how the potential donor should act (pay the cost or not).23
Norms determine what reputations the acting agent will earn. A simple version of such a strategy may24
state: If the reputation of the recipient is good, then donate, otherwise defect; and: if an agent donates,25
he earns a good reputation, otherwise a bad one (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b). It was shown that such26
simple strategies, whose norms only consider actions, cannot maintain stable cooperation. With these27
norms, agents will earn a bad reputation if they do not donate to those with a bad reputation. This is28
known as the problem of justified punishment (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003).29
This problem can be solved using norms that also consider the current reputation of the recipient (so30
called second-order norms) or even the reputation of the donor itself (third-order norms) (Ohtsuki and31
Iwasa, 2004, 2006). Each possible scenario (a good/bad donor cooperates/defects against a good/bad32
recipient), linked to a resulting reputation (good/bad), leads to 256 possible norm combinations. An33
exhaustive search for successful norms showed that only eight can reliably maintain cooperation (Table34
1). They are collectively referred to as the “leading-eight” but some are mentioned separately in the35
literature, e.g. L1 “standing” (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003), L636
“stern judging” (Pacheco et al., 2006; Santos et al., 2018) and L7 “staying” (Okada et al., 2017a; Sasaki37
et al., 2017). Standing was one of the first strategies to address the problem of justified punishment (see38
above), whereas stern judging and staying have been suggested as the best indirect reciprocity norms in39
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strategy assessment rules (norms) situation action rules
G B G B G B G B donor G B G B
C D action (does not apply)name number
G B G B recipient G B
standing L1 G G B C
L2 B G B C
L3 G G G D
L4 G B G D
L5 B G G D
stern judging L6 B B G D








Table 1: Norms and action rules of the leading-eight. They show many similarities that often confirm
with intuitive moral judgement, e.g. if a donor is currently considered bad and he cooperates with a good
recipient, he can earn a good reputation, i.e. being forgiven. C = cooperates, D = defects, G = good
reputation, B = bad reputation
recent years.40
Most previous studies on the subject, however, assumed a simplified condition: public assessment41
(e.g. Leimar and Hammerstein (2001); Nowak and Sigmund (1998a); Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004); Pacheco42
et al. (2006); Panchanathan and Boyd (2003); Santos et al. (2018); Suzuki and Kimura (2013); Xu et al.43
(2019)). It means, that every agent has a single reputation value (good or bad), which is agreed upon44
by all. This value may be wrong, i.e. a cooperative player may have a bad reputation because an error45
had occurred, but this error will be unanimously shared. One way to interpret such a public reputation46
system is a scenario where a single agent observes the interaction between a donor and a recipient, upon47
which he might commit an error, and then shares his perception with all others. If however, at least48
two agents observe the interaction and may commit perception errors independently, they may disagree49
on the donor’s reputation afterwards. Thus, instead of a single public reputation, there are private50
opinions. This causes severe problems to the reputation based moral system since the current reputation51
(or opinion) influences the assessment of future interactions. Two agents with different opinions may52
assess the same situation differently, even if no further errors occur (see an example shown in Figure 1).53
This way, with enough initial perception errors, bad opinions can wrongly cascade through the population,54
even to the point where no one will cooperate any longer. Stern judging is especially struck (Okada et al.,55
2017a; Brandt and Sigmund, 2004) and some have even argued that the problem of private assessment56
(aka private monitoring or private information) is detrimental for all leading-eight (Hilbe et al., 2018).57
Yet, there are also studies which suggest that at least staying is doing okay, in simulations (Okada et al.,58
2017a) as well as via analytical approaches (Okada et al., 2018, 2020).59
In this paper, we investigate an approach to coping with private assessment, first mentioned in (Krell-60
ner and Han, 2020), called ‘pleasing’. Pleasing rests on two simple rationales: i) agents are being aware61
that others may have distinct opinions and ii) agents want to maximize the chance of getting a good62















OPINIONS BEFORE OPINIONS AFTERINTERACTION
Figure 1: Example of a disagreement error. Left column shows opinions before the interaction. Only the
opinion about the recipient (re) differs for the observers and the donor (do). Since the donor considers
the recipient bad, he refuses to help. For the observers, who consider the recipient as good, this appears
as a bad act. Hence the reputation of the donor suffers and disagreement spreads.
players think he should cooperate (Figure 1), he will cooperate to please them.64
In this scenario, information sharing is not a collective act. Instead only the current donor is actively65
seeking information. Which seems almost natural for him to do, since this information is viable for his66
future reputation. This enables one to avoid a major problem associated with information sharing: who67
is responsible and ready to pay the cost of the information distribution (Suzuki and Kimura, 2013)? It68
is natural to assume that the direct beneficiary of some information would be willing to make effort to69
gather it. The donor could even decide to compensate others for the information they share, depending70
on how much additional cost pleasing is worth to him.71
Is it possible to solve the problems of private assessment with ’pleasing’? Judging from moral intuition,72
pleasing may seem an undesirable behavior. People who are too easily persuaded by the majority might73
be looked down upon. And it is easy to imagine situations where pleasing would cause harm to society74
or individuals; when one goes along with punishing people who do not deserve it. But are such acts the75
misfire of an otherwise good mechanism that prevents us more often from punishing people we ourselves76
mistakenly believe to deserve it? And besides human societies, can pleasing inform how artificial agents77
can be designed and engineered to maximize cooperative behaviour and overall productivity (Paiva et al.,78
2018; Andras et al., 2018)? We contribute to answering these questions and to the question, whether79
indirect reciprocity does work under privates assessments. We therefore study pleasing as well as original80
leading eight, from a strict evolutionary game theory perspective (Sigmund, 2016) in wide parameter81
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ranges.82
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We next describe our models and methods. We83
then show how pleasing improves the evolution of cooperation first under the assumption that mutations84
are rare (Hilbe et al., 2018; Sigmund, 2016; Han et al., 2013), to compare and build upon the results85
of Hilbe et al. (2018) and Krellner and Han (2020), where the same assumption was adopted. We then86
analyze how robust pleasing is if only a few other agents (instead of all possible agents) are pleased and87
when pleasing bears an additional cost. Thirdly, we examine the influence of selection strength under88
rare mutations. Then, relaxing the assumption of small mutations, we study the impact of varying both89
selection strengths and mutation rates. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings while pointing90
out limitations and future directions. We also provide an appendix with additional results, to complement91
those in the main text and show the robustness for different parameter choices.92
2 Models and Methods93
We test pleasing for its evolutionary stability and cooperativeness. We run agent-based simulations under94
private, noisy and incomplete information, adopting a similar setting as in Hilbe et al. (2018); Krellner95
and Han (2020), for a clear and convenient comparison. We consider four strategies in co-presence:96
two unconditional strategies, i.e. always cooperate (AllC) or always defect (AllD); and two conditional97
strategy based on norms, i.e. the original leading eight (O1, O2, ... ∈ Ox) and the pleasing leading eight98
(P1, P2, ... ∈ Px). We also compare the performance of pleasing and the original leading eight when99
playing against AllC and AllD, i.e. when there are three strategies in co-presence, in order to provide a100
direct comparison with the analysis in Hilbe et al. (2018) (section 3.4). The original leading eight behave101
as described in the literature (Table 1). Px players may also try to please other Px agents.102
We use two complementary methods to study stability and resulting levels of cooperation. Both build103
upon the results of Krellner and Han (2020), who studied three strategies at a time under the limit of rare104
mutation. First, we put all four strategies together under the same restriction. This way we can provide105
a direct competition between the previously studied leading-eight strategies, Ox, and the newly defined106
pleasing ones, Px, and how their struggle influences the evolution of cooperation as a whole. Second, we107
relax the restricting assumption to study evolutionary dynamics under any mutation rate. For this second108
approach, we consider again only three strategies in co-presence: AllC, AllD and either Ox or Px. This109
way we can readily compare our results to other previous simulations (Okada et al., 2017b; Hilbe et al.,110
2018) and to previous theoretical analyses (Okada et al., 2018; Okada, 2020b). Using three strategies111
keeps interpretations clear and concise and reduces the burden of computational demand (which can112
be very excessive) 1. In both experiments, we analyze stability as the frequency of the strategy under113
evolutionary pressure. We subsequently compute the average cooperation rate in the evolving population114
(denoted by Copop), which we use to indicate the success of indirect reciprocity.115
1The computation demand increases exponentially with each additional strategy. For example with N = 50, a single
parameter setting of two strategies requires 51 simulations, three strategies 1275 and four strategies would require 22100.
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2.1 Model and Agent-based Simulation Setup116
We consider a well-mixed population of size N . Reputations have two possible states, 1 (good) or 0 (bad),117
and players can choose between two actions, cooperate or defect. Agents have either an unconditional118
strategy (AllC, i.e. always cooperate, or AllD, i.e. always defect) or a conditional one. Conditional119
strategies are defined by a vector pair (α, β) that represent their assessment and action rules. The120
assessment rule α has eight entries, one for each combination of three situational features: action and121
current reputations of donor and recipient. An entry is equal to 1 if the resulting reputation is good,122
otherwise it is 0. The action rule β corresponds to the four possible combinations of reputations of the123
donor and recipient. An entry is 1 if the agent will cooperate in that situation and 0 if he will defect. As124
in Hilbe et al. (2018); Krellner and Han (2020), we will focus on the ‘leading-eight’ strategies Lx (Ohtsuki125
and Iwasa, 2006) (see Table 1).126
2.2 Reputation Dynamics127
We simulate the reputation dynamics for players in a population with at most three fixed strategies. The128
state of reputation is given by the N ×N image matrix M(t) of the population at time t (Uchida, 2010).129
An entry mi,j(t) is equal to 1 if player i has a good opinion of player j, and 0 otherwise. Initially all130
entries are set to 1, a state of homogeneously good reputation. To ensure that initial image matrix has131
no effect, only data after an initial transition period is used to compute results. As described in Hilbe132
et al. (2018), this way other initial states only change results for the extreme opposite, homogeneously133
bad reputations, and even then, only for L7.134
Each time step in a simulation consists of three parts. First, a donor do and a recipient re are drawn135
at random from the population. The donor then decides whether to cooperate. Unconditional players136
always act the same, whereas the standard leading-eight players decide by their action rule β and their137
opinions of themselves mdo,do(t) and of the recipient mdo,re(t). For pleasing leading-eight players see138
below. In the third step, reputations are updated due to observations.139
The donor and the recipient always observe the interaction, whereas other players independently140
observe it with probability q. Any observation (even by the focal donor or recipient) is independently141
altered due to error with probability ε towards the opposite action (e.g. cooperation instead of defection).142
Each player who has observed the interaction updates her opinion of the donor according to her assessment143
rules, the action she observed and her current opinions (i.e. even the donor updates her opinion of herself).144
The result is the image matrix M(t+ 1). This process is repeated for 106 rounds in all the results shown145
below).146
2.3 Pleasing147
Pleasing Px discriminators differ from the original Ox discriminators in two ways. They share their
opinion with others (Ox won’t). Also, they decide how to act based on the opinion of the majority when
being chosen as a donor. Let nw be the number of players the donor wants to please and NP the number
of pleasing Px players in the current population. The donor will consider the opinions λ of np pleasing
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0, if m̂y < 0.5,
1, if m̂y > 0.5,
randomly 0 or 1, otherwise.
(2)
The pleasing donor will act according to her action rule as if the majority opinion was her own. Afterwards149
observers assess the action as before (Note that the averaged opinions are not used again, especially not150
to update the opinions of the donor. AllC and AllD do not have opinions, Ox do have, but neither are151
sharing information.)152
2.4 Payoffs153
Based on simulations we compute the average rate of cooperation xA,B of agents with strategy A towards154
agents with strategy B. To ensure that initial image matrix has no effect on these values, we disregard155
the first half the simulation, so out of 106 total time steps we only use the data of the second half to156
compute cooperation rates, similar to (Hilbe et al., 2018). There are q strategies present in a population157
of size N , each is played by ni agents in a population of N =
∑q
i=1 ni. The average payoff per interaction158
of an agent with strategy A (denoted by π̂A), in which the agent is involved, is given by the benefits she159















i , where n
∗
i =
ni − 1, if A = i,ni, otherwise. (3)
For some analysis we also subtract a cost cp for pleasing strategies. Thus, the payoff for a leading-eight161
strategy that adopts pleasing Ap is given by π̂
′
Ap
= π̂Ap − cp.162
2.5 Social learning through imitation163
We assume that players may consider updating their strategy according to their accumulated payoffs.
We model this process using Evolutionary Game Theory methods for finite populations (Traulsen et al.,
2006). Particularly, in each step of the evolutionary process, two players, i and j, are randomly selected
from the population for update via pairwise comparison: i will adopt the strategy of j with a probability
given by the Fermi function
pi,j = (1 + e
−s(π̂j−π̂i))−1. (4)
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The parameter s defines the ‘imitation strength’ or ’selection strength’, i.e. how much p depends on the164
payoff difference. For s = 0, imitation will be entirely random and as s approaches infinity the imitation165
process becomes more deterministic. In most of the results presented below, we adopt s = 1 for a fair166
and convenient comparison to Hilbe et al. (2018), but we also study the influence of different regimes of167
selection strengths.168
2.6 Evolutionary Dynamics under the Limit of Rare Mutation169
We want to test the stability of pleasing strategies Px against all possible rivals. Thus, for each pleasing170
strategy we consider populations with players that either play the Px strategy at hand, its original version171
Ox, AllC or AllD, so four strategies in total. We further assume for simplicity and convenience the limit172
of rare mutations (Nowak et al., 2004; Wu et al., 2012). A mutation is an event where a player of strategy173
A adopts any of the remaining strategies at random. In the limit of rare mutation, the population will174
almost always be in a homogeneous state with a single strategy present, since these states are absorbing175
and cannot be escaped by imitation alone. If a population consists of only strategy B and a new mutant176
of strategy A arrives, the population will subsequently either reach a homogeneous state of A or B and177
there will be at most these two strategies present at during the transition. The probability that A will178
take over, i.e. fixate, is denoted by ρB,A. It is determined through the probabilities of incremental steps179
towards more players of A, T+A , or the reverse step T
−
A , as follows.180
Let k (1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1) be the number of individuals using strategy A and (N − k) the number for



















These fixation probabilities determine a Markov Chain that describes the evolutionary transitions be-182
tween the homogeneous states of q strategies, with a transition matrix Z of size q × q. The entry (of183
matrix Z) zA,B = ρB,A/(q − 1) for A 6= B and zA,A = 1 −
∑q
j=1 zj,A. The normalized eigenvector with184
eigenvalue 1 of the transposed matrix of Z provides the selection-mutation equilibrium σ for each consid-185
ered strategy. It describes, in the long run, how often the population will spend in a homogeneous state186
of the corresponding strategy (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2006). (In some cases a unique eigenvector cannot187
be computed numerically. In such cases we would simulate the times spent in homogeneous states with188
the transition matrix as follows. Start in each strategy state, randomly transition according to matrix189
for 106 times while add up instances of being in a state, add all q runs to gain σ.) This small mutation190
limit approach has been shown to be widely applicable to scenarios which go well beyond the strict limit191
of very small mutation rates (Sigmund et al., 2010; Rand et al., 2013; Zisis et al., 2015).192
Evolutionary success of discriminators such as Px or Ox is not a guarantor for high cooperation rates.193
Strategies may succeed with little or no cooperation as players adopting such strategies defect against194
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each other in their homogeneous state (e.g. P8 and O8). We therefore simulate the cooperation rates195
within each homogeneous population. We then obtain the average cooperation X̂ (Copop) of the whole196
system X̂ =
∑q
i=1 σixi,i, where σi is the frequency of strategy i at the selection-mutation equilibrium197
and xi,i the cooperation rate in the homogeneous state of strategy i (which is one for AllC and zero for198
AllD).199
2.7 Evolutionary Dynamics under any Mutation Rate200
Despite the usefulness of the approximation in the limit of rare mutations, it presents unavoidable limi-201
tations to the dynamics of a population as described above, e.g. that only two strategies can be present202
at the same time. Moreover, it has been shown experimentally that behavioral mutations or exploration203
occur frequently in human interactions (Traulsen et al., 2010; Rand et al., 2013). Non-rare mutations also204
play an important role in enabling cooperation in the context of social dilemmas (Garćıa and Traulsen,205
2012; Duong and Han, 2020; Antal et al., 2009). Hence we consider evolutionary dynamics under any206
mutation rate between q = 3 strategies: AllC, AllD and a discriminator, either Ox or Px. In such a207
setting, the finite population of size N can reach any composition state given by the set208
∆qN := {n = (n1, n2, n3)| 0 ≤ ni ≤ N,
q∑
i=1
ni = N}. (7)
There are |∆3N | =
(N+2)(N+1)
2 possible population composition states. A transition between two such209
states is only possible if they are neighbors in that graph, i.e. if the number of agents of strategy A210
decreases by 1 and the number of agents of strategy B increase by 1 and both are possible. Such a211
transition can occur as a result of a mutation or imitation. A mutation occurs with probability µ. Hence212













i.e. the probability, to pick an agent of strategy A, times the added probabilities of a mutation towards215
B and an imitation of B. Imitation only happens if there was no strategy change due to mutation. The216
probability of this specific imitation depends on the frequency of B and the payoff differences between217
the two (see equations 3 & 4).218
With q = 3, a state has at most six possible neighbors to transition to. The probability to transition219
to any other state is 0. The probability to stay in the current state is 1 minus the sum of all transition220
probabilities. All these probabilities together define a Markov Chain of all population states with a221
transition matrix of size |∆3N | x |∆3N |. For small enough population size, N , and number of strategies q,222
we can again compute the normalized eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 of the transposed matrix and obtain223
the selection-mutation equilibrium σ.224
Each of the |∆3N | components of the vector σ describes the time spent in a particular population state.225
We can therefore compute the relative frequency of the strategies by multiplying the number of agents226
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Note that this formula can also be applied to the rare mutation limit that was described above, where228
there are only q homogeneous states, ni = N and fA = σA.229
Furthermore, we can compute the average cooperation rate X̂ (Copop) with the average cooperation230





The average cooperation in a state is computed with the average cooperation of strategy j towards k232












nk − 1, if j = knk, otherwise . (11)
3 Results234
3.1 Improvements by Pleasing235
We study the evolutionary dynamics between four strategies: Px, Ox, AllC and AllD. The key parameters236
to be considered are the error rate ε (in this study an observation error) and the benefit size b (the cost237
c is normalized to 1). The benefit determines whether cooperation is worth the effort in the first place.238
Only b > 1 allows cooperators to outperform defectors. However, AllC will always be invaded under239
rare mutations by AllD for any b, since the former always pays the cost in addition to receiving the240
same benefits as the latter. Only discriminators such as Px and Ox can actually outperform defectors241
by withholding benefits to them but sharing them amongst themselves. This act requires an additional242
capability for information acquiring and processing (even in a simple form), which is why the noise in243
acquiring of correct information, i.e. the error rate, is the second important factor.244
We first investigate Px when pleasing is not restricted (i.e. players can acquire and consider the245
opinion of all other pleasing players) for varying ε and b (fixing c = 1). Results for Copop are shown in246
Figure 2. The abundance of warm colors in the right columns (i.e. with pleasing) compared to the left247
ones shows the great potential of the new pleasing strategies. Copop is increased in wide parameter spaces248
for most LX . With pleasing, higher benefits almost always increase cooperation rates and high Copop is249
even possible for frequent errors. P1, P6 and P7 utilize pleasing the best among the leading-eight. High250
benefits and low error rates (lower right quadrant) seem generally best for cooperation, compared to low251
benefits and high error rates (upper left quadrant).252
The improvements are the result of both pleasing strategies’ high abundance and high cooperation in253
homogeneous state (Coho). Coho of most Px are in fact close to 100% for ε < 0.3, see Figure 3. The254
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Figure 2: Effect of pleasing on the evolution of cooperation (Copop), across benefit b (x-axis) and error
rate ε (y-axis). First and third columns show Copop in populations of original leading-eight Ox, AllC and
ALLD; second and fourth columns show populations augmented by a fourth strategy Px. Parameters:
N = 50, nw = 50 (i.e. pleasing all Px players in the population), q = 0.9, s = 1.
General effect : Pleasing greatly facilitates the evolution of cooperation in large parameter regions. Copop
is lowered by pleasing only in a small area of low error rates and low benefits for a single strategy family,
L2. For these parameters, pleasing slightly decreases the abundance of discriminators (both P2 and O2)
and hence the resulting Copop.
Parameter space: The original leading-eight were successful to some extent only if error rates and benefits
were both relatively low (lower left quadrant). More frequent errors but also higher benefits decrease their
abundance (due to invasion by AllC). With pleasing, higher benefits almost always increase cooperation
rates instead. Now, high benefits can also offset the negative effects of high error rates (lower right
quadrant). Even if error occur as often as every third time, there are still a few cases that can maintain
more than 50% cooperation.
Different strategies: With original leading-eight, only three of the leading-eight were successful to some
extent (L1 ”standing”, L2 & L7 ”staying”), showing small parameter ranges that allow for at least 50%
cooperation. With pleasing, this is true for all but one strategy, L8. Although relatively abundant, L8
showed no cooperation, with or without pleasing. Four populations (L1, L6 “stern judging” & L7, less so














error rate ε error rate ε
Figure 3: The abundance of Px (i.e. SME, left side), their cooperativeness in homogeneous state (CohoP ,
right side) and the resulting Evolution of cooperation in the whole population (Copop, center) for different
error rates ε in populations of Ox, Px, AllC and AllD. Other parameters: N = 50, q = 0.9, s = 1, b = 5.
Since Ox and AllC are rare in almost all populations (Figure A1), Copop is roughly SMEP times CohoP .
Both are reduced by more frequent errors. However, for most strategies, such as P1 and P7, Coho remains
maximal until almost every third observation is wrong (ε = 0.3). In those cases, the bottleneck for Copop
is the stability of the pleasing strategy. For P6 on the other hand, stability remains maximal for some
time whilst Coho steadily decreases. The bottleneck is the cooperativeness of the pleasing strategy (the
same is true for P8, which shows no cooperation at all). The rather unnatural condition of ε = 0 shows
some special dynamics. The cooperation in a P6 population is greatly reduced, whereas it is the only
condition in which the cooperation in a P8 population is considerable.
differences in the resulting cooperation rates (Copop) were mainly caused by differences in frequency.255
The only exception, as in previous studies (Hilbe et al., 2018; Krellner and Han, 2020), was P8, which256
failed to have any cooperation with itself and was therefore exactly as frequent as AllD. Pleasing Stern257
judging (P6) is also different in that it still dominates the population almost all the time for increasing258
error rates but becomes steadily less cooperative.259
The observation rate, the probability that a non-involved player perceives what the donor does, was260
previously reported to be of little effect when any errors are present (Brandt and Sigmund (2004), compare261
also with Hilbe et al. (2018)). The same is true for pleasing, except if zero observation rate is approached.262
The current results of stability and cooperativeness are a replication of (Krellner and Han, 2020), in263
which a population consisted of only three strategies at a time. The inclusion of the original leading264
eight strategies in the populations of this study did not change the success of pleasing. It is however265
important to analyse this larger set of strategies together in co-presence. Adding (or leaving out) a266
strategy can strongly affect the final outcome of population dynamics. Strategies can catalyze each267
other, so a formerly weak one might be catalyzed by other strategies that were ignored in the first place,268
and become dominant, as observed in Garćıa and Traulsen (2019); Sigmund et al. (2010); Han (2016).269
3.2 Evolution of Pleasing270
To better understand this remarkable capability of pleasing to promote cooperation under private assess-271






Low Error Rate High Error Rate
Figure 4: Fixation probabilities and frequency for populations of O1, P1, AllC and AllD for two conditions,
left: ε = 0.05, right: ε = 0.25. In both conditions: N = 50, q = 0.9, b = 5, s = 1. Frequency is depicted
as red surface around the circles representing the homogeneous population states. Fixation probability
is depicted as follows: 0 ≤ ρ < 0.001 arrow omitted, 0.001 ≤ ρ < 0.015 weak, 0.015 ≤ ρ < 0.025 neutral
drift (in the sense that 1N = 0.02 is the transition with exactly similar payoffs), 0.025 ≤ ρ < 0.15 strong
and 0.15 ≤ ρ very strong, transitions. Exact values are given in Table A2. The most important difference
is the less likely transition from AllD to P1 (ρ = 0.07 for rare errors, ρ = 0.005 for frequent errors).
Pleasing is risk dominant against all other strategies in both conditions (i.e. the transition probabilities273
towards it are always higher than those away from it, see also Figure A3). However, it is only the most274
frequent strategy for low error rates, whereas AllD is so for high ones. Even though, AllD is losing in275
direct comparison with P1 in this condition.276
To explain this unusual result, we look at a cyclic pattern between P1, AllC and AllD under high277
error rates. Transitions from P1 to O1 or AllD are close to zero, so we ignore them for now. P1 will278
transition to AllC with a chance of 0.02. That means, 298 out of 300 mutations fall back to P1, the279
others transition to AllC. In there, a P1 mutant has about 0.04 chance to cause a transition to P1 (so280
higher than in return). An AllD mutant on the other hand has a 0.67 chance to cause a transition. I.e.281
in 4 out of 300 cases, AllC transitions back to P1 (and will likely stay there for some time, increasing282
the frequency of P1), but in 67 out of 300 cases it transitions to AllD. In AllD finally, only 0.5 of 300283
mutations will lead to a transition towards P1. Any other case means to stay in AllD, highly increasing284
its frequency (see also Table A2 and Figure A4).285
In other words, although P1 is risk dominant, the transition from P1 to AllC and then to AllD is286
actually more likely than the transition from AllD back to P1. O1 plays no significant role, more so287
for high error rates, but practically in both conditions. The examples given is quite representative. We288
provide plots risk dominance across ε and b in Figure A3. A noticeable exception is P6. It has a very289
low probability to invade AllD even for low error rates, but in turn no other strategies can invade it (i.e.290














number of agents pleased number of agents pleased
Figure 5: Number of agents pleased. Shown is the abundance of Px (i.e. SMEP , left side), their
cooperativeness in the homogeneous state (CohoP , right side) and the resulting evolution of cooperation
in the whole population (Copop, center), for different effort levels of pleasing, i.e. the number of players
that the donor tries to please. Other parameters: N = 50, q = 0.9, b = 5, ε = 0.05. As more players are
considered, Copop often increases steeply and then levels of.
3.3 Efficiency of Pleasing292
Enquiring all other opinions is likely to be expensive (e.g. calories, time or opportunity costs). We293
therefore analyze cooperation rates if players would try to please smaller numbers of agents. Figure294
5 shows an example for some commonly used parameters, but our additional analysis show that the295
qualitative results are robust for other values of ε and b (see Figure A6). As the number of pleased296
players increases, Copop often increases steeply, then levels of. That means that pleasing a subset can be297
as effective as pleasing the entire population. Even pleasing just a few agents is enough for P1 (standing)298
and P7 (staying) to reach their full potential. P6 (stern judging) on the other hand appears to have299
a threshold after which it rapidly reaches total stability (SME= 1), but each additional agent that it300
pleases makes it more cooperative. If error rates are higher, more agents are needed to be pleased, i.e.301
increases in Copop appear later or are less steep (Figure A6).302
We also consider the cost of pleasing itself. Namely, pleasing players have to pay a cost cp each303
time they are selected as donors. This cost represents the time and energy they spend obtaining oth-304
ers’ opinions, but could also include compensation for some third-party agents from whom they gather305
information. Increasing the cost steadily decreases Copop with a single exception; P6 (stern judging)306
was not affected by smaller costs (Figure 6, right side). Since costs do not change the cooperativeness307
in homogeneous states (Coho), the changes in Copop are entirely a result of lowered stability against308
the other strategies, which are not affected by costs. As described above, L6 had the highest SME and309
was stable enough to not lose any ground, even when baring considerable costs for pleasing. Additional310
analysis with different parameters support this finding, whereby higher benefits enable L6 to endure even311
higher costs (see Figure A7).312
A noteworthy dynamics arises in the case of P2. The Copop of its population first decreases with rising313
costs, before it increases again. Most populations follow the same pattern. With rising cost, pleasing314





























Figure 6: Dynamics across different additional costs of pleasing. Left: abundance (SME) of the four
strategies Ox, Px, AllC and AllD. Right: Cooperation in the population (Copop). Other parameters:
N = 50, q = 0.9, s = 1, b = 5, ε = 0.05. For the most part, increasing costs reduce Copop (right), until it
reaches the level before the introduction of pleasing. The SME (left) shows, that pleasing strategies are
gradually replaced by AllD and Ox, until the frequencies replicate the states for three strategies without
Px. In the case of P6 this means, only AllD are left in the population and cooperation seizes. The
exception to this pattern is P2. Its frequencies is reduced, but the losses are first picked up by AllD.
Only if costs rise even further, O2 can reclaim frequency back from AllD and Copop increases again. P6
(stern judging) is even entirely unaffected by small costs.
before the introduction of pleasing (Figure 6, left side). In the case of P2 however, there seems to be an316
intermediate state, where pleasing agents are decimated, but original cannot yet take over. It lead to an317
intermediate rise of AllD in that population.318
The results obtained here remain robust if we consider a population of three instead of four strategies319
(i.e. when removing the original leading eight) (Krellner and Han, 2020). Pleasing can be efficient and it320
can endure some additional cost, before losing its advantage.321
3.4 Stochastic Effects: Varying Selection Strength and Mutation Rate322
We now study the impact of varying the strength of selection s, i.e. how the evolutionary dynamics change323
on the continuum between random and almost deterministic. When considering selection strength, it is324
important to keep in mind, that very low s will allow any naive cooperator to persist in a population. If325
s is low enough, transitions do not depend on payoff differences at all but are just random drift. Hence,326
all strategies have the same frequency of 1/q. So, at least under weak selection, the cooperation in the327
population depends heavily on the set of strategies that are present in the population of interest.328
It is therefore necessary to discard low s as irrelevant or, as we suggest, to compare the dynamics329
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Figure 7: Evolution of Cooperation (Copop) across selection strength s in three different populations:
original:={AllC,AllD,Ox}, pleasing:={AllC,AllD,Px} and baseline:={AllC,AllC,AllD}. We plot a base-
line to provide an objective comparison, i.e. what two cooperative strategies can achieve against AllD.
Parameters: N = 50, q = 0.9, b = 5, ε = 0.05. If the selection strength is very low, the baseline pop-
ulation can reach Copop = 2/3. However, the cooperation will drop to around zero for s > 0.1. Six of
the original leading eight actually exceed that baseline, O1, O2 and O7 by a large margin, but O3−5 also
show significant improvement. Pleasing improves cooperation further in six cases and partly in another
one.
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of populations of interest with a baseline population BASE. Our BASE consists of the same number of330
strategies, but all cooperative strategies are replaced by AllC (so multiple instances of it are possible).331
In this BASE, no strategy uses any mechanism to support cooperation. So, we can measure the level of332
cooperation that results only from the composition of strategies and stochastic evolution. For example,333
for very low s, Copop in BASE is exactly 2/3, a substantial value. But, it will drop as the selection334
strength becomes larger. So, instead of choosing an arbitrary threshold s and entirely disregard any335
results for weaker selections, we compare the dynamics in populations with a discriminator, AllC and336
AllD to those in the mentioned BASE population.337
Results show that the selection strength (s) has an important impact on Copop (Figure 7). Often,338
Copop drops and then seizes for large s. However, some pleasing strategies (such as P6 and P7) and an339
original one (O2) show substantial Copop for the entire range (note that for some cases such as P6, SME340
and hence Copop could not be computed or simulated in the way described above 2 and the values are341
omitted in the graph. But even the populations with Ox that eventually drop to zero show significant342
more cooperation than the BASE. This is especially true for O1, O2 and O7. This increase is not trivial,343
some strategies such as P6 show even less cooperation than the baseline for a large range of s.344
But even so, pleasing is still able to make substantial further improvement in terms of the overall345
levels of cooperation. P1 (standing), P6 (stern judging) and P7 (staying) are again the best. P2 switches346
from increasing Copop to decreasing it right before s = 1. However, it is the only strategy, where pleasing347
is unsuccessful and decreases cooperation, and the failure is not repeated for other game parameters (see348
Figure A8). And, in four strategy populations, P2 will always be more frequent than O2 (Figure A9).349
So even if in the cases where the original have higher potential, they lose in direct competition with the350
pleasing strategies.351
We finally study evolutionary dynamics without the restriction of rare mutations. As described above,352
a population may now reach any possible composition of three strategies. The frequencies of these states353
and the cooperation within allow us to measure Copop in a similar way as before. The full significance354
of the results is again better seen in comparison with the BASE population. The left column of Figure355
8 shows that even such a population can have high cooperation levels if mutations are frequent and356
selection strength is small, whereas cooperation seizes in the opposite direction. This is to be expected357
but comparison with Ox populations (second column) show that they are actually slightly worse than358
BASE for its ideal parameter setting. But they also show broad bands of parameter ranges, where they359
increase Copop significantly. This is again especially true for P1 and P7. Both have large parameter360
ranges with more than 0.6 Copop, whereas rare mutations and a specific s = 1 had suggested, there361
would be less than 0.4.362
The general cooperation promoting effect of pleasing remains robust. In the parameter range shown,363
pleasing always increases Copop in comparison to the original leading eight (even P2). P6 benefits the364
most, as before. But it is also apparent that for many strategies the absolute difference of Px from OX is365
smaller than that of Ox from BASE. Original strategies sometimes increase Copop greatly, yet pleasing366
2In most of these cases, all invasion in more than one strategy was numerically computed as zero and therefore there is
no single eigenvector. If invasion would be impossible, the evolutionary process would stop in an homogeneous state, giving
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Figure 8: Space of evolutionary parameters µ (y-axis) and s (x-axis) for a wide yet not exhaustive range.
Columns 1, 3 and 5 show cooperation in the population of BASE population (twice AllC and AllD),
original population (Ox, AllC and AllD) and pleasing population (Ox, AllC and AllD). Columns 2 and
4 show difference of their neighboring columns (right - left) to highlight changes. Parameters: N = 50,
q = 0.9, b = 5, ε = 0.05.
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can still lead to further improvement. A band of medium parameter sizes is best for pleasing in the same367
manner it is for the original. From the examined range of parameters, the scenario of rare mutation368
limit, with an selection strength s = 1 as used in previous work (Hilbe et al., 2018) (which correspond369
roughly to the lower right corner) provides the hardest condition for most discriminator strategies and370
cooperative behaviour to prevail. Their predictions of Copop might be to low and pleasing even better371
at enabling indirect reciprocity.372
It is noteworthy that if µ is very small, populations may still spend most of the time in homogeneous373
states (Figure A10). The results reflect this. For µ = 0.001 they resemble the predictions of the previous374
models for rare mutations, confirming the validity of that approach.375
4 Discussion376
Our analyses show three main findings. First, pleasing enhances indirect reciprocity and enables high co-377
operation levels, significantly outperforming the original leading eight strategies in this respect. Pleasing378
strategies invade original leading eight and tend to invade AllD, but can suffer from random drift towards379
AllC. Second, pleasing is proven efficient, working well even when pleasing only a few players or suffering380
an additional cost (e.g. from information acquisition). Third, considering a larger parameter space of381
selection strengths and mutation rates is important. Indeed, we found that, contrary to the conclusions382
from previous work (Hilbe et al., 2018), original leading eight, especially standing (L1) and staying (L7)383
(Sigmund, 2016), can enable high cooperation levels, exceeding those of baseline populations (Figure A2).384
Yet, pleasing can still lead to substantial further improvements in terms of cooperation.385
4.1 Explanation of Pleasing’s Success386
We expected pleasing to benefit reputation-based strategies such as the leading-eight. They rely on387
information and pleasing uses more information for each decision, compared to the original leading-eight.388
However, pleasing players use this information not to update their own opinions and to directly reduce389
disagreement. Instead, they use it to selfishly improve their own reputations. So, it may come as a390
surprise that this strategy increases both stability and cooperativeness. In the study that discovered391
the leading-eight strategies, all successful norms had a single best set of action rules (Ohtsuki and Iwasa,392
2006). They can all be described as follows: defect, unless cooperation would give you a better reputation393
than defection. In that sense, these strategies were acting selfish already. Selfishness can lead to stable394
cooperation.395
Since pleasing is a better strategy to optimize one’s reputation than the original leading-eight, better396
reputations and hence more cooperation within L-X players come not as a surprise. However, pleasing397
has three less direct effects. It does also raise the reputation of AllC and lowers the reputation of AllD.398
As a result, pleasing strategies fare much better against AllD, but lose some advantages over AllC. This399
causes the loss of stability for L2 for some parameter ranges. In all other cases however, it is a net win400
in SME.401
The changes in reputation cause a further effect. Pleasing shifts reputations away from mixed (half402
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bad, half good opinions) towards good for L-X and AllC and towards bad for AllD. As a consequence,403
there is less possibility for disagreement. If reputation is unanimously good (or bad), there cannot be any404
disagreements. Increasing reputation that was already above 50% good tends to decrease the number of405
disagreements between agents. Disagreement was an important cause of bad reputation for L-X in other406
studies with private assessment (Brandt and Sigmund, 2004; Hilbe et al., 2018). Hence, pleasing likely407
leads to a positive feedback to improve reputation of L-X players even further.408
Third, pleasing affected the actions of agents directly and enabled more cooperation for the same409
amount of good reputation. Whereas an agent with 60% good reputation would receive a benefit 60%410
of the time from original leading eight agents, it would receive it 100% of the time from pleasing agents411
(if they please all other L-X in the population). A random opinion would be good 60% of the time, but412
the majority opinion is always good. The same principle causes the opposite effect for agents with bad413
reputations (i.e. AllD in most cases), who earned smaller benefits than for the same reputation with the414
leading eight strategies. This polarization of cooperation and defection appears to have enhanced the415
stability of pleasing players as well as their cooperation with each other.416
As a consequence of these opinion and cooperation dynamics, pleasing achieves three things. First,417
it can successfully discriminate AllD, withholding help to them whilst continue to help themselves. It418
can do this much better than the original leading eight. Second, it maximizes its own reputation for low419
errors and therefore does not allow AllC to earn higher reputations or higher benefits. Third, high error420
rates lead to equally lower reputations of both pleasing and AllC, so pleasing will sometimes save the cost421
of cooperation without receiving less benefits than AllC. This way, it can achieve slightly higher payoffs.422
In contrast, pleasing usually fails, when invading AllD becomes very hard. Although AllD cannot invade423
it in turn, even neutral drift from pleasing to AllC causes a cycle that reduces the abundance of pleasing424
(see Figure 4 and A4).425
4.2 Relevance, Limitations and Future Work426
Pleasing is a novel information sharing approach to solve the problem of private assessment. It does not427
aim to solve the problem by transforming private into public assessment, for example by a mechanism to428
synchronizing opinions. Instead it offers players the ability to maximize their own reputation. Yet, it can429
lead to reliable indirect reciprocity even for the hardest conditions studied to far, when information is430
private, noisy and incomplete. We expanded the work on pleasing by studying its success against original431
leading eight strategies as well as the unconditional ones. With this we have substantially extended and432
generalised the previous findings in Krellner and Han (2020).433
Several important results in the literature of indirect reciprocity were obtained using a deterministic434
evolutionary game approach (see a review in (Okada, 2020a)), e.g. by using replicator dynamics (Nowak435
and Sigmund, 1998b; Uchida, 2010; Okada, 2020b) or evolutionary stable strategy analyses (Ohtsuki,436
2004; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006). These works thus did not account for the impact of stochastic factors437
such as selection strength and mutation or behavioural exploration. Both of them have been shown to438
play an important role in driving the outcomes of evolutionary dynamics (Sigmund, 2016; Traulsen et al.,439
2010). Their values are usefully specific to concrete interaction situations and populations, which can be440
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estimated in behavioral experiments (Traulsen et al., 2010; Rand et al., 2013; Zisis et al., 2015; Domingos441
et al., 2020). Indeed, when mutation is quite rare, given a similar payoff structure and behavioural update442
rule (i.e. Fermi), an intermediate selection strength approximately in the range [0.01, 0.1] is usually443
observed that best explains experimental results (Rand et al., 2013; Zisis et al., 2015). We observe that,444
when the intensity of selection is within that range, some original leading eight can already promote the445
evolution of cooperation under private assessment, which is contrary to the conclusions by Hilbe et al.446
(2018), likely because their analysis focuses on a rather high selection strength (namely, s = 1) and they447
did not compare the cooperation levels to a baseline.448
We also show that the differences in performance between original and pleasing leading eight strategies449
are considerable, putting our study in line with research that reports similar differences (Hilbe et al., 2018;450
Brandt and Sigmund, 2004) and that places certain strategies above others. Those are standing (L1),451
one of the first strategies ever being investigated (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan and452
Boyd, 2003), stern judging (L6) (Pacheco et al., 2006; Santos et al., 2018)) and staying (L7) (Okada et al.,453
2017a; Sasaki et al., 2017)). L1 and L7 are somewhat similar. They are already reasonably abundant and454
cooperative in homogeneous states before the introduction of pleasing. With pleasing, they are abundant455
and cooperative over large parameter ranges. Stern judging on the other hand has no chance to evolve456
without pleasing. But with it, its abundance is near 100% over a considerable range of parameters and457
is also the most robust against additional costs of pleasing.458
Is pleasing realistic? It seems highly impracticable to literally run around and ask what others think459
in a situation where one is supposed to help someone, especially if help is required fast. However, pleasing460
could be done in real life by other means. Instead of asking right beforehand, one could ask habitually461
and have the information ready at hand when needed. This way the information might be outdated,462
but a small decrease in accuracy should not diminish the effect of pleasing all together, comparable to463
pleasing a subset of players. Secondly, instead of asking, opinions could be inferred via theory of mind464
or other cognitive abilities, see e.g. (Tomasello et al., 2005; Han et al., 2012, 2011; Han, 2013). This is465
a natural step in studying indirect reciprocity under private assessment given that humans (and many466
other animals) clearly possess such cognitive abilities (Meltzoff, 2007; Woodward et al., 2009). Similar467
capabilities were already shown to improve indirect reciprocity, but when attributed to the observer468
instead of the donor (Radzvilavicius et al., 2019).469
A minor limitation of the current study is that the pleasing described here will not always find the470
action with the best possible reputation. Rather, it is a cheap heuristic to find a very good action but471
could be improved. Instead of using the average opinions (see Methods) to decide for an action, it could472
use each opinion of each agent itself to infer the consequences of each action for each pleased agent and473
then choose the action that grants the best possible reputation. Considering this more sophisticated474
approach could push the limits of pleasing even further.475
Another open question is how pleasing can deal with irrelevant or miss-leading information. Here,476
we did not assume that pleasing players can differentiate between their own kind and others. If those477
strategies would share opinions, a pleasing player would consider it valuable information. He may fail478
to recognize the majority opinion of pleasing players and therefore may fail to earn a good reputation.479
Pleasing unconditional players instead does not yield any benefit, since they treat him independently of480
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low error rate Invader
O1 P1 AllC AllD SME
Resident
O1 - 0.1119 0.0953 0.0000 O1 0.0357
P1 0.0000 - 0.0199 0.0000 P1 0.7782
AllC 0.0123 0.0224 - 0.6678 AllC 0.0269
AllD 0.0442 0.0686 0.0000 - AllD 0.1592
high error rate Invader
O1 P1 AllC AllD SME
Resident
O1 - 0.0985 0.0160 0.0000 O1 0.0060
P1 0.0000 - 0.0182 0.0000 P1 0.2404
AllC 0.1191 0.0431 - 0.6678 AllC 0.0054
AllD 0.0001 0.0047 0.0000 - AllD 0.7482
Table A2: Abundance of strategies (SME, right) and fixation probabilities of a single invading mutant in
a homogeneous resident population in a population of four strategies O1, P1, AllC and AllD. We consider
two conditions, top row: ε = 0.05 (low error rate), bottom row: ε = 0.25 (high error rate). In both
conditions: N = 50, q = 0.9, b = 5, s = 1. Values correspond to graphical depiction in Figure 4.
his actions. However, information sharing of such players may take many forms. Since unconditional481
players do not actually track opinions, information they share would be some form of lying. They might482
always say everybody is good, or bad, or produce random answers. Other discriminators may also share483
information, which could be their true opinion or also lies. The effect is unclear. Some preliminary484
simulations show for example, that AllD players, who claim everybody is bad, actually benefit pleasing485
players. And, original leading eight that share their opinions with pleasing players, seem to bring them486
virtually no benefits. Such behavior should help out pleasing players, since they would want to please487
originals to gain more benefits from them. However, it seems that pleasing was already so good in488
invading original leading eight, that it made no difference to the results.489
The full range of lying strategies will be investigated in the future. Next, we aim to study how pleasing490
fares against other strategies that are specifically equipped to take advantage of pleasing. Those include491
lying strategies as described above and also strategies that rely on the opinions of others but do not492
want to share their own opinions to avoid costs. The latter were pointed out as a problem of information493
sharing in general (Suzuki and Kimura, 2013). As mentioned, a solution could be to pay players for their494
information. The options seem endless.495
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Ox Px AllC AllD Copop
Figure A1: Abundance of strategies in populations consisting of Ox, Px, AllC and AllD (four left columns)
and resulting cooperation in the population (Copop, right column). Parameter space of benefit to cost
ratio (x-axis) and rate of observation error (y-axis). Parameters: N = 50, q = 0.9, s = 1. For most
conditions, populations consist almost entirely of Px and AllD. Copop closely resembles the abundance
of Px, since it is the only cooperative strategy with relevant abundance and the cooperation rate in its
homogeneous state is about 100% (Figure 3). The only exception is L6, where P6 is very abundant but
less cooperative as errors become more frequent.
23
















Figure A2: Results for an alternative selection strength (namely, s = 0.1), compared to Figure 2 where
s = 1. Effect of pleasing on the evolution of cooperation (Copop), across benefit b (x-axis) and error
rate ε (y-axis). First and third columns show Copop in populations of original leading-eight Ox, AllC
and ALLD; second and fourth columns show populations augmented by a fourth strategy Px. Other
parameters: N = 50, nw = 50 (i.e. pleasing all Px players in the population), q = 0.9. Most original
leading eight populations have substantial areas with mediocre Copop. Pleasing is able to increase Copop
to above 70% for a large parameter range all but one strategy. Both populations have higher cooperation















being greater than 0.5 (shades of blue) indicates that Px is risk dominant (three left columns). The
frequency of Px in populations with all four strategies is given in the rightmost column, both for varying
the benefit to cost ratio (x-axis) and observation error rate (y-axis). Other parameters: N = 50, nw = 50,
q = 0.9, s = 1. Pleasing is risk dominant against original leading eight unless errors frequent and benefits
are low (especially b < 1). Risk dominance can explain frequency in the case of L6. And it predicts
some low frequencies of Px, for example when AllC is risk dominant against P7 (high error rates, high
benefits). But, risk dominance alone does not lead to a high frequency. For example, the relative
probability to invade AllC increases for P1 as error rate increases, but its frequency decreases. Absolute

















Figure A4: Fixation probabilities for leading eight number one (standing), i.e. in a population of P1, O1,
AllC and AllD, for varying the benefit to cost ratio (x-axis) and observation error rate (y-axis). Other
parameters: N = 50, nw = 50, q = 0.9, s = 1. If fixation of P1 in AllD becomes lower than the fixation
of AllC in P1, P1 loses abundance to AllD, since the fixation of AllD in AllC is always very high (see

















Figure A5: Fixation probabilities for leading eight number six (stern judging), i.e. in a population of
P6, O6, AllC and AllD, for varying the benefit to cost ratio (x-axis) and observation error rate (y-axis).
Other parameters: N = 50, nw = 50, q = 0.9, s = 1. P6 can invade AllD with a relatively small
probability, i.e. at most about the chance of random drift 1/N = 10−3.91 (orange) and even smaller as
benefits decrease and errors become more frequent. But in this parameter space, P6 cannot be invaded
by any other strategy and hence has an almost maximal abundance (see Figure A1).
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Figure A6: Evolution of cooperation in the whole population (Copop) for different effort levels of pleasing,
i.e. the number of agents that the donor tries to please. We consider four conditions, low: b = 5, ε = 0.05,
easy: b = 15, ε = 0.05, hard: b = 5, ε = 0.25 and high: b = 15, ε = 0.25. Other parameters: N = 50,
q = 0.9, s = 1. As more players are considered, Copop often increases steeply and then levels of. If errors
are more frequent (upper graphs), this plateauing occurs later. P6 is an exception in that Copop steadily
increases due to increasing cooperation in its homogeneous state (see Figure 3).
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Figure A7: Effect of increasing the additional costs for pleasing on the cooperation in the whole population
(Copop). Four conditions, low: b = 5, ε = 0.05, easy: b = 15, ε = 0.05, hard: b = 5, ε = 0.25 and high:
b = 15, ε = 0.25. Other parameters: N = 50, q = 0.9, s = 1. Higher benefits (lower graphs) allow
for higher Copop. For high benefits (right graphs), P6 (stern judging) can sustain substantial costs of





























Figure A8: Alternative game parameters to those in Figure 7, namely b = 15, ε = 0.25. We study the
evolution of cooperation (Copop) for varying the selection strength s, in three different populations. In
particular, pleasing:={AllC,AllD,Px}, original:={AllC,AllD,Ox}; baseline:={AllC,AllC,AllD}. We plot
a baseline to provide an objective comparison, i.e. what two cooperative strategies can achieve against
AllD. Other parameters: N = 50, q = 0.9, b = 5, ε = 0.05. If the selection strength is very low, the
baseline population can reach Copop = 2/3. However, the cooperation will drop to around zero for
s > 0.1. Six of the original leading eight exceed that baseline, O1, O2 and O7 by a large margin, but






























Figure A9: The effect of varying selection strength (s) on strategy frequency (left) and evolution of


































Figure A10: Heatmaps of population states, O1 (top of triangle), AllC (right corner) and AllD (left
corner). Columns show three different selection strengths, from left to right s = 0.01, 0.1, 1. Rows show
three different mutation rates, from bottom to top = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 (same range as Figure 8). Colors
are customized for each graph from zero to maximum, see color bars. Parameters: N = 50, q = 0.9,
b = 5, ε = 0.05.
For low s, all strategies have similar abundance, as expected. For low µ, population spends most of the
time in homogeneous states at the corners; and for high µ in the center.
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